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ABSTRACT:  Starting from the behavioural 
approach to economic competition, this 
paper enlarges the traditional view of 
economics on the essence of potential 
competition by including not only the 
potency of competition from new but also 
the potency of competition from existing 
firms of the competitive fringe and from 
distant substitutes because of their ability 
to be actualised upon changes in market 
conjuncture. The author specifies three 
types of barriers to potential competition: 
barriers to entry, barriers to switching 
demand, and barriers to competitive 
fringe expansion. This paper is devoted 
to the analysis of the latter, answering the 
question of their influence on the market 
power of incumbent firms. The theoretical 
and empirical analysis in the paper explains 
the important role of establishment and 
exploitation of barriers to competitive fringe 
expansion in maintaining the market power 
of a dominant firm and the maximization 
of its economic rent.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ‘structure-conduct-performance’ approach to economic competition 
analysis, which was introduced by Mason in the 1930s (Mason, 1939), fitted the 
dominant neoclassical paradigm of microeconomic analysis, drawing a line 
between the rich microeconomic theory and the insufficient empirical analysis 
of market organisation. However, even the empirical studies that were carried 
out under this approach did not succeed every time. Many of them showed a low 
level of correlation between market structure parameters and such indicators of 
market efficiency as firms’ profitability, the level of their market power, allocative 
efficiency, etc. This stimulated a scientific search for the reasons for such a 
low correlation and for the factors that were able to counteract the impact of 
traditional structural factors (such as market concentration and price elasticity of 
demand) on the market equilibrium parameters and the market efficiency. 
The first results of that search were in the 1950s, when Joe Bain in his ‘Barriers to 
New Competition’ raised the problem of the influence of potential competition 
on the conduct of incumbent firms and the nature of market equilibrium (Bain, 
1956). Baumol, Panzar, and Willig based their theory of contestable markets 
on the important role of potential competition by limiting the market power of 
incumbent firms (Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982). Researchers showed that any 
member of a market that is open for entry and exit cannot exploit its power, and 
so has no power. Any price increase or deterioration of other selling conditions 
in the market results in new players entering the market and decreasing the 
market shares of incumbent firms and the overall market concentration, which is 
considered to be the main indicator of market power in mainstream economics.
These and other findings over the last fifty years have created traditions of potential 
competition analysis. ‘Barrier to entry’ changed from being a highly specialized 
term into a widely used one because of the increasing popularity of entry barriers’ 
investigations. However, although these investigations evolved, they remained 
narrow in scope. Bain’s initial look at potential competition as the competition of 
new entrants situated on the market border dominated this evolution by losing 
the other types of potential competition. That loss is not visible in the structural 
approach to competition analysis, but is emphasized by a behavioural approach. 
The potential competition is not only the competition of new firms that are ready 
to enter the market upon deterioration of its equilibrium parameters, but any type 
of inert competition (the competition of distant substitutes or the competition of 
existing firms of the competitive fringe which do not rival but go along with the 
dominant firm) that can become active upon changes in market conjuncture. BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION
105
Starting from this view of potential competition, this author reconsiders the 
current theory of entry barriers and extends it to an examination of the extent 
of barriers to potential competition. Developing this idea, and considering the 
natural desire of incumbent firms to maintain their market power through 
creating different barriers, this paper investigates theoretically and empirically 
the impact of barriers to competitive fringe expansion, as an alternative type of 
barrier to potential competition, on the market power of incumbent firms. 
Section 2 analyses the current approaches to the investigation of entry barriers 
and gives grounds for the relevancy of its extension. This includes a classification 
of barriers to potential competition. The third section explains the dominance 
theory as the theoretical basis of barriers to competitive fringe expansion creating 
and exploitation. The results of the author’s empirical analysis of the data of 
the Ukrainian economy’s concentration are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.
2.   THE NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF BARRIERS  
TO POTENTIAL COMPETITION
The term ‘barrier to new/potential competition’ was introduced by Bain in 1956. 
It refers to the advantage of established sellers in an industry over potential 
entrant sellers, which was reflected in the extent to which established sellers could 
persistently raise their prices above competitive levels without attracting new 
firms to enter the industry (Bain, 1956, p. 3). Such a definition equates barriers to 
potential competition with barriers to entry, making a first step in their mutual 
theoretical evolution. According to this approach the researcher classifies barriers 
by firms’ ability to overcome them: low, overcoming, restrictive, and blocked.
Another approach to the investigation of entry barriers was introduced by Stigler. 
He defined a barrier as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) 
that must be borne by firms seeking to enter an industry but is not borne by 
firms already in the industry (Stigler, 1968, p. 67). According to this approach 
three types of entry barrier exist: administrative, structural, and strategic. This 
classification, unlike the previous one, discovers not the size but the nature of 
barriers. However, it has almost lost its applicability in the last fifty years. Much 
modern research testifies to the ability of big powerful companies to influence 
the activities of their actual and potential competitors not only directly, through 
changing the level of strategic barriers, but also by modifying the parameters 
of the market equilibrium or the regulatory environment, which used to be 106
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identified as structural and administrative barriers to entry. Such a company can, 
for example, enlarge market capacity through an active advertising campaign, or 
create custom or license restrictions to entry through institute of lobby.
Cross-type diffusion of entry barriers is also observed in scientists’ attempts 
to amplify Stigler’s classification. For example, Avdasheva and Rosanova put 
barriers such as vertical integration, diversification of firm’s activity, and product 
differentiation into the group of nonstrategic barriers (Avdasheva &Rosanova, 
1998, p.48-56), while Fyliuk identifies them as strategic (Fyliuk, 2009, p.118-119). 
Who is right?
Vertical integration may be identified as a vehicle for consciously limiting of 
potential competition, especially in the sphere of natural monopoly or adjacent 
to it (Tirole, 1988/ 2000, p.26). But in a transition economy with poor market 
infrastructure it can also be an instrument for providing continuity of the 
production process or a way to minimize operational risks (Williamson, 1971). 
The wave of mass privatization in the Ukrainian economy in the early 1990s, 
unlike motives of cross-subsidization, determined the conglomerate structure 
of Ukrainian business groups at that time. Product differentiation may reflect 
changes in consumer needs or be a vehicle for filling free product or place niches 
as a way of seeking rent. So we can see that today barriers to entry are becoming 
increasingly less objective and are obtaining the traits of the strategic behaviour 
of powerful companies. 
The intensification of the barriers’ strategic nature actualizes the need for one 
more classification: it is necessary to discover the risk points of the appearance 
of potential competition. Looking for the criteria of such a classification in 
economic theory and the practice of market operations, the author has found the 
inadequacy of prevailing term ‘barrier to entry’ to the wide range of challenges 
from potential competition. Among the sources of potential competition are not 
only new entrants from the market’s border but also small incumbent firms of 
the competitive fringe. Growing up under the ‘price umbrella’ of a dominant 
firm, such potential competitors are converting into actual competitors, while 
the implicit structural competition between them and the dominant firm is 
turning into behavioural competition, which was described by Hayek (Hayek, 
2002). Another powerful source of potential competition is the competition of 
distant substitutes. The price increase of natural rubber, because of a range of 
cartel collusions in the USA and Europe in the 1920s, stimulated the invention of 
its synthetic substitute and the extension of market borders (Stocking & Watkins, 
1964, p.127). The penetration of aluminium cans into the market of packing BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION
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materials for liquids broke down the monopoly of sheet tin producers (Scherer & 
Ross, 1990 /1997, p.347). The expansion and cheapening of mobile and internet 
telephony has limited the market power of fixed telecommunications. There is no 
clear entry of new firms into the market, but the market extends its boundaries 
to cover new firms and make them compete for consumer demand in the former 
zone of incumbent firms’ market power. 
This brings us to the understanding that the entrance of new firms is just one way 
of activating potential competition, while barriers to entry are only one element 
of incumbent firms’ strategy to maintain their market power. The existence of 
other sources of potential competition makes powerful companies create other 
types of barriers to potential competition. Therefore now is the time to distinguish 
between ‘barrier to entry’ and ‘barrier to potential competition’. Unlike Bain, this 
author defines a barrier to potential competition as any obstacle that is able to 
neutralize potential competition impact in the relevant market and that excludes 
this strategic parameter from the long-run profit-maximizing function of the 
powerful incumbent firm. 
After defining the essence of barrier to potential competition, let us return to its 
classification by source of potential competition, the need for which is indicated 
above. There are three types of such barriers:
•	 Barriers	to	entry.	This	group	of	barriers	includes	all	the	obstacles	which	restrict	
entrance to the market by firms which have not yet been involved in a relevant 
or in the same production;
•	 Barriers	to	competitive	fringe	expansion,	which	keep	those	companies	from	
growing in order to maintain the market power of dominant firms;
•	 Barriers	 to	 switching	 demand,	 which	 abate	 the	 competition	 with	 distant	
substitutes through shrinkage of relevant market boundaries in order to 
intensify the market power of incumbent firms.
To overcome the disparity in the investigation of different types of barriers to 
potential competition, this paper moves away from analysis of barriers to entry 
and focuses on another type of barriers to potential competition – the barriers to 
competitive fringe expansion.108
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3.   DOMINANCE THEORY AS A THEORETICAL BASIS OF BARRIERS  
TO COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION ANALYSIS
Reality rarely shows us a pure monopoly, notwithstanding the level of entry 
barriers. Much more often potential competitors have to deal with a dominant 
firm that is a strategic market leader. This leadership may be the result of a big 
market share (according to different countries’ legislation, the firm has to control 
between 25% and 65% of the market to be recognized as dominant (Fyliuk, 2009, 
p.60) or other conditions like first-mover advantage, information asymmetry, 
administrative leverage, etc. All the alternative ways of leading are known as 
barometric leadership and are considered to be additional evidence of dominance, 
but are rarely the fundamental ways. Such a barometric leader may become a real 
market leader (or dominant firm) in the long run by using its market power to 
increase its market share and the economic rent.
Notwithstanding the method of dominance, a market leader firm undertakes 
the function of establishing the market equilibrium parameters, taking into 
account the existence of the competitive fringe. The residual demand curve for 
the dominant firm’s product (dr(P)) is created by deducting its competitive fringe 
supply (Scf(P)) from the total demand curve (D(P)) at any possible price (Figure 1).
 dr(P) = D(P) – Scf(P)  (1)
Figure 1:    The model of dominant firm and its competitive  
fringe interdependence
Q
P
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D(P)
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Holding a first-mover advantage, the dominant firm realizes the impact of its 
own move on the market equilibrium. If it puts a price that is higher than P1, 
firms of the competitive fringe occupy the market (the quantity supplied by 
the competitive fringe under this condition is always higher than the quantity 
demanded by consumers) without leaving space for the dominant firm. If it puts 
a price that is lower than P0, it pushes all the firms of the competitive fringe out 
of the market. If the price fluctuates between P0 and P1 the demand is satisfied 
mutually by the dominant firm and competitive fringe firms, while the proportion 
of the division between these two groups of firms is determined by the strategic 
decision of the dominant firm on price. The higher the price set by the dominant 
firm, the bigger the proportion of market demand satisfied by competitive fringe 
firms, and the weaker the dominant firm’s market position. The converse is also 
true (Viscusi, Vernon & Harrington, 1992/ 2004, p.220-222). Thus the dominant 
firm cannot behave like a monopolist that is protected by high entry barriers, but 
must take the activity of the competitive fringe into consideration. 
If market dominance is not based on absolute but on comparative cost advantages 
that stream from sunk costs of previous periods or from economy of scale, 
maximizing profit strategy causes the dominant firm to lose its dominance. 
Setting the price at a level that is higher than the production costs of competitive 
fringe firms lets these firms make an economic profit and invest it in capacity 
increase. The latter is the key to competitive fringe supply increase, and the 
residual demand for the goods of the dominant firm decreases. Hence the profit 
maximizing strategy in such a market has earned the name ‘myopic pricing’. If 
the dominant firm sets a limit price that is equal to or a little lower than the 
production costs of a competitive fringe firm, taking into consideration the 
potential competition of this group of firms, it maintains dominance. 
Limit pricing is not only an example of a barrier to competitive fringe expansion. 
A dominant firm can also use such classical barriers as investment in excessive 
capacity or brand proliferation. The first means a dominant firm creating 
excessive capacity to use in the case of a competitive fringe’s output increase, or 
even in the case of those companies investing in capacity increase. This strategy 
of a dominant firm causes a glut in the market and a falling of prices, killing 
two birds with one stone. On the one hand it eliminates motives for expansion 
– the price is too low to make a profit. On the other hand it limits the financial 
resources of competitive fringe firms, making them insufficient for investing in 
expansion. The barrier of brand proliferation works in the same way. As the costs 
of the dominant firm are lower, the physical, financial, intellectual, and other 
resources of the dominant firm are worth more than those of the competitive 110
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fringe firm, and it is able to steal the thunder in product differentiation. By 
settling all profitable niches in product and geographical space, the dominant 
firm limits the quantity of residual demand for the goods of competitive fringe 
firms, and in this way resists their expansion in the relevant market. 
So the dominant firm has got only partial market power. It can only obtain its 
economic rent by raising and strengthening barriers to potential competition.
4.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BARRIERS TO  
COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION
The empirical analysis of Ukrainian markets of asymmetric oligopoly allows 
us to discover the important role of barriers to competitive fringe expansion in 
maintaining the market power of the dominant firm. The markets were selected 
for the analysis not by using the traditional methodology of the Antimonopoly 
Committee of Ukraine and many other competition agencies, which are based 
on the criteria of unilateral dominance1, but by using the index of structural 
leadership elaborated by the author (ksl):
   (2)
where CR1 and CR3 are concentration ratios for one and three of the biggest firms 
in the relevant market, respectively.
For the markets with unilateral dominance this index plays the same role as 
the Linda Index2 does for other oligopoly markets: they allow the assessment 
of dominant firms’/firm independence of competitive fringe firms’ strategies, 
starting with the gap between the market shares of the leader and its closest 
follower. The index of structural leadership may adopt a value from 0.5 to infinity. 
The first tells of almost identical market shares of the first and the second biggest 
1  According to the Ukrainian Law of Economic Competition Defence, a firm’s market share 
that is bigger than 35% is considered to be an attribute of its unilateral dominance. 
2  The Linda Index defines the boundary between the leaders and other firms within an 
oligopolistic industry. It is calculated by the formula:  , where Qi is the ratio 
between the average share of the first i firms and the average share of the remaining n-i firms. 
It is calculated for two, three, and more market leaders up to the moment when Ln becomes 
lower than Ln+1 (Ln<Ln+1). The proper n shows the boundary.BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION
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firms in the market, while the latter testifies to the presence of one monopolistic 
producer. 
To select asymmetric oligopoly markets from 580 Ukrainian industrial markets3 
the critical level of index is pointed at 1.5. This means that the second biggest firm 
in the market is three times smaller than the first one. After selection the author 
investigates the changing dynamics of the biggest (dominant) firm’s market share 
in every selected market through the five years of 2006-2010. The results show 
the negligible volatility of such market shares. The average value of the index 
of the dominant firm’s market share intertemporal change, which is calculated 
by dividing the market share of the dominant firm in 2010 by its market share 
in 2006, is 0.97 (Table 1). This testifies to the dominant firms’ immunity from 
potential competition of the competitive fringe and the effectiveness of existing 
barriers to competitive fringe expansion. 
Table 1:    Influence of dominance power on dominant firms’ market share 
intertemporal change
Group of markets by index of 
structural leadership, 2006
Average value of the index of 
dominant firm’s market share 
intertemporal change
1.5 ≤ ksl < 2 1.08
2 ≤ ksl < 5 0.92
5 ≤ ksl < ∞ 0.82
Total 0.97
To detect a correlation between dominance power, which is measured by the index 
of structural leadership, and the dominant firm’s market share intertemporal 
change, the author divides the overall sample of Ukrainian asymmetric oligopoly 
markets into three groups by the value of the structural leadership index:
1) 1.5 ≤ ksl < 2;
2) 2 ≤ ksl < 5;
3) 5 ≤ ksl < ∞ (Table 1).
The average value of the index of the dominant firm’s market share intertemporal 
change has been calculated for every group of markets that shows an inverse 
3  The statistical base of the investigation is industrial concentration data for 580 Ukrainian 
industrial markets for the period 2006-2010, which is the result of monitoring by the Centre 
of Complex Research in the Field of Antimonopoly Policy (Kutz, Venger, Kireev et al., 2011)112
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relation between investigated variables. The higher the index of structural 
leadership, the more intense the erosion of the dominant firm’s market power. 
The search for reasons for the detected dependence results in the next conclusion. 
The further behind the competitive fringe firms follow the dominant firm, 
the more neglectful is the attitude of the latter to such potential competition. 
The dominant firm does not consider small firms of the competitive fringe as 
competitors, losing circumspection and easing barriers to competitive fringe 
expansion in trade for bigger economic profits. As a result it loses its dominance 
in the long run. At the same time, the dominant firm, whose competitors run 
it a close second, is apt to create and exploit the barriers to competitive fringe 
expansion. This allows them to not only withstand potential competition but also 
to increase their market share in the long run. 
5. CONCLUSION
To summarise the above, a barrier to competitive fringe expansion, as well as 
other types of barriers to potential competition, is a significant factor in creating, 
maintaining, and strengthening the market power of the dominant firm. Its 
effective use lets the dominant firm create a sustainable source of economic rent, 
while neglecting it takes away not only the market power of the dominant firm 
but also its market niche, where a market power zone existed before. 
Barriers to competitive fringe expansion are very close to those investigated 
in detail under the barriers to entry theory. As traditional entry barriers they 
can manifest in the field of price by using mechanisms of limit pricing, or in 
the field of investment by vertical integration, business diversification, and 
cross-subsidization, or in the product field by increasing product and place 
differentiation. There is a difference between the two types of barriers to potential 
competition: they are distinct in allocation of potential risk zones, where the 
dominant firm’s market power is jeopardized and may disappear. Focusing on 
the risks of new entry while neglecting expansion of the competitive fringe can 
bring a dominant firm the same bad outcome as myopic pricing, or an even worse 
outcome because of the absence of high short-term economic profits. Thus taking 
into consideration the barriers to competitive fringe expansion by developing 
dominant firms’ competitive strategy is a way to maintain and strengthen its 
market power in the current economy. BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE FRINGE EXPANSION
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